

1-9-16

London Problems

X 144

142. ^{M44} ^{Chaffin} ~~Wife~~ - ~~Wanda~~ split over VN in 1965
COM Boston - Melba remittes

150 ~~Ann~~ 1974 ~~Foul~~ - ~~extensive~~ VN
+ disturb

1980 ~~was~~ ~~Don~~ for Regan (HSC? ASW?)

125 "Debra's balance" appears LNW, LSR? (HAK)

so. "Marian" ^{US} (at less than Fc)

127
HAK

"Will" = "low and very not
will you accept?"
(1956-R-290?)

|| would be only don't
|| best at: SC unhappily?

1957 - HAK complete story, book and (month?)

Smith R appears completely as

Oct 4 - Spent

(CBM)

|| must last!

Statute becoming "debra's balance"

129 Good books. Smith

RAND

the don't (I don't believe in it)

JFR - Rebels soft on Cur (HSC in recess?)

1961-
was in JPR campaign - for USMC

no "Gap" ~~Feb~~ 1961 BUT

151 ^{SU} ~~frontal~~ expansion

Summer 1974 COM "The Quest for Distance"

WG:

Nitpe: margins for SALT delegation.

N ~~near~~ ^{near} Aug. 8-9

looks similar from SeaDef (from ¹⁹⁷³ C14)

News 76 - GPD II

(election: Carter vs. Ford)

influence on both

(Rohrer was back involved for Dan Piro

(Chas. Long, Kenneth Willson

(Monsieur, Pierre B)

debate in 1976 - Was CW over?

= RISC-~~68~~

Nitpe: correlation forms timing in SU direction

Contract for inverted Repeating.

165 SU not meeting for win out (out + O-L?)

out not FS, either

165

SU "come back & win" (like USAF?) (SU = AW 165

166 Ppno: like Poles in Europe's shadow

SU blackmail (in face of SU FS threat)

"like US/SU in '62"

(if SU thought ~~that~~ it was fools.)

see 261 - ~~renew~~
166 HAK - ~~improvement~~ 1974-75 Note

Q: 167 CF - Schles from '74 (N)

FY 76 no perceived superiority (MT) vs. essential equivalence
(Aug 75) new rules, 3 new directions

no great FS position, just US "superiority"
is needed, +CF is sign of "evolution" (what?)

neutrality, non-aligned, overcoming to SU

168 - ~~and~~ have US out of Europe

Q 168 builds

X (169) C-T in 1978 from 14, 1977 (Center alone to come in)
- some result?

+ Berlin '61 US SUPERIORITY (?)

(yes, it existed: but

critical to entire, SU blackmail?

X OR gives "essential equiv." imposed to
make K back down, or if not, DEF?

see York

Was US think of FS critical - compared to K think
of end street?

176 Wunder us.

Schles: Continues arms race (CF and CW).

Feb 1977 Triest. + Ex. Pol. (Hollnacker)

178 "trade" with SU = treason.

US retreat from world power effort.
isolationism (mild.)

CPD + CDEY Alert out of Carter. (Philato)
us. Wunder
(Schles for Sec Def); Harold Brown as compromise

CPD right after Carter visiting
SU drive for dominion
unparalleled mt. buildup
world domination

(Was Wunder ever really "imperial"
(or purely "imperial" empire,
not Comt))

198

Q
X 202 SU "improving" after a FS exchange!

(would it survive?!)

= "correction/punish"

2 R, 1 US!

see

W. HAK!

Rumors: SU "war-fight" (=D-L) us.

205 - sup

CF 259

236

not including

205

Can I say, "beliefs" in "superiority" is meaningless
in foreign affairs?

Belief of "world"

US allies

SU

(Parker { or by USG?
or by belief of SU in USG belief?)

Did it decide Berlin & C-II?

Claim that SU is "driving toward all-out superiority" (in crisis?)

(Not, FS!

But Chruschev brand not only US "sub."

but intends to strike!

202 CW Liberal (me) Land-lie on SU threat

(tell ^{to} '61? then, Belgrade, Am
Order

Johnson
H³

AW (Parker, Wolfgang
Sten B!)

(Int, NATO Agreed)

Q

211 coalition

1977-78: Concessions to CPD,
"compromise, record."

→ FALL OF SHAW, early 79

What happened to firing Center?

192- campaign

235 "Chin & area" - fragment

(attempt to avoid a over the
presidency (Stone, ^{UPA} 280) which
he got!) (1st-Kennedy?)

236 Dec-12 ¹⁹⁷⁹ before Office
NATO-P-II?

JC Bureau Council

SO building?

model 19X report document

(after N-buro) (RFE)

from 23, 1980

(date?)

early 79 (?) Shock falls

date!

End - hostage crisis

238 "fall of from" 1978 Washington same year
("nicknamed expose")

(240)

SV/Agenda revised no response

[a proposal of Bg/Center shift, before hostage crisis

& Agence - both promoted of Bg/Center/Rockefeller?!

[after fall of Shah = "loss of China" ?!]

from early 1979!

DE quoting SAC 2-23-80

241 Ehta is not monolithic - but "dominant" regarding
war (except Center last 2 years?)

Carter, like JFK in '61, didn't challenge &
reject Soviet bloc CW:

1961 Cuba-I

(Berlin
VN
Mun (East))

July 77 246 PRY-10 assem: Joint (D-52) N2A-MM worldwide
CM, MX

ag: JC: SU buildup was "a great danger" Wg?
"Surrounding" →

Sept 77 MX \$60-70B' FS, C-F
vs. solution

Aug ~~77~~ 77 RPO for Persian Gulf

CW option: 252 SU control West ^{Europe}
vs. US control: NATO
(what if Eur. independence?)

[Real SU seek pol/dip advantage with the buildup?
Compared to K?
& compared to JFK/US? (Imp.)

(255)

CPO - SU was moving toward crest. FS, to use as US did
in '50s + '62' - to end of world domination (and, West Eur)
(after FS, and even after US retreat. (?)
SU would have more MT than France!
could control US (NO) (distance numbers, effects!)

252

252

Kernel for, + effect of, EC/struct. and

(as in Helphentic!)

61

(Cos. MGS B - "no effort" no.

(1) say = great for + ^{many} clan of surp. del advice

det (it wasn't involved)

(17) Prop: \mathbb{S} is a main function of SU Thmct / US are outside of

was to serve US Agency in

West Europe (original US role, reoriented)

Have we
UK base done
eq? or France?

(also: FU at least 2 vaps.)

(expansion? or) ²⁵⁷ monetization of US ^{deficit} surplus

Arguing in formal colonial TW

(rather than enter?) independence (best,

2) Can influence

257 SO: 70's the same?

11 (dist SU and FU? but good to distn US-FU).

by kind of availability or use:

[not in 1961-62] [but ^{4x} not inquired...]

What if but the FS threat (an "oral" —
in face of huge 2nd-strike cap on both?)

With can be confident in using FU threat
— yet it has some cost ("oral FS") for launch!

But loss of it ~~offered~~ US ~~more~~ in
TW in 1950's-1960's:

But if ~~if~~ could SU use it in 1970's-80's?

Now, it would it — and so do we!

|| Roth from "Berlin/Caracas" (SUNs) to
|| deferral!

Kaliningrad; western Ukraine;

US: Baltics; eastern Ukraine?

Sprink Re the kernel! years, long.
(Sprink has deferral, settled)

258 (What will SAGT-2 promise? (It can't be MX, ALCM,
Friedt; or an X-Bow

^{Brown}
Perry? "MOM would be unbearable"

1979 = Plan B: yes! get will of it!
not MX! (+ D-5i)

CF don't demand CBMs, just France!

Alternative:

What if I (RAND: No) had gone
if USA were
sponsor!

for SLBMs-only — give up MM
after Sept. 1961

(And for 10,000 SUICBMs,
all 60 MT/100 MT

+ IRBMs

So what? (US NFC; and
human the miss
+ sub)

(after C-II? (VER Antel to own!))

S107-62 and -63

ban missile tests

ICBMs, MRBMs, the miss ((CTB))

get
(K to agree
to inspiration

US ant,
Hans up,

(Control de?)

SU ant

"

"Debate" on SALT-II was not helpful.

266: seeks accommodation with Right (CPD)
dislike look of middle ground

BHO = Carter: Come - on admission, early CW-I; out on CW-II
goes out on CW-III

(felland of: Cold Warrior? + ~~DR~~ R. Carter)
in CW?

260 "Modemji" Arnold = 28/6 as in 1929-80

= CF, improving (vs. "Aunt
"Squid")

which VEK "Magical"

in 1961 (Various)

(A don't: wrong?)

[Europe; Golan;

(New Western)

(Using plan ^{via. FU on 8/21} model have

on 1) initial initial for Europe
2) initial

263 N ^{HAK} (Bond/Bell?)

actually have related good are being

N notes FU
(+ Albert = '69:)
but not "US sup."

"examined regime," being, def. agreements (SALT-I)
Korean, China times

(to get see in VA)

(as direct FU think
as SC forces:

Carter officially reverses it (as does HAK,
on SALT-II

Berlin, India

in SOTU for (3, 1980)

(a = about, 3 for '78 a earlier in '79)

as long

unusual)

to-229 Brown 3-12-79 Carter document

look can think to

data 2d-use to the on FU;

or even, FU (SC direct to the US FU in VA?) in Kulb, hang, Kilopa,
HK--

1-7C-E

Benefit/advantage of CW/Russian trade/US FS position
(Washington, "superior"
CC...

is not only to MIC

or is (CW) down side

but to: US Recovery in West Europe + new, East
Middle East (contin)
+ TW

(Russia, Ukraine
Russia
Central Asia)

"reform, reform, reform" reform + Recovery
(Does not only in trade/finance,

i-16-16

to the CPO-III

~~was~~ tried to CPO-II?

- similar?! (New-Cons

Korea?)

Was any agreement (trial?) with SU/ Russians?

are from!

(Hope: all our agreements were to the good -

highly affected by Korea -

can we contact was not very important,

was CW!

263

240

^{SU} Did Agreement invasion army and (foreign)

purpose on 9-11? (yes!)

on Korean invasion

(TG + Primer!)

(not, Int!)

on Prud Harden

on 1973 -)

("Rothroads"; C-II:)

(when all of these promoted, encouraged, promoted

(on "independence," false flag? now, under 9-11? Rothroads

as well as exploited

(recommended)

263

discuss and

(Korea?)

TR

1-10-10

Controlled professional
interviewed into

(stability)

Substance of our control (SALT-IT Red)

Section
265

already been accepted (SALT-II, so regional

but potential arrival, of regional

under (us-CW)

until SOTU 80, Control abandoned (SALT-II...)

(before Range: until IKF...

no reports, in 1981, 82, 83, 84, 85, ...

?

1-12-16

Center's ^{mobile} 17X was

1. A premise that it was needed on arial
at Range I distance

2. Short ICBM unavailability in 1977 (or 1980's)
was very detracting, high risk of SU proprio
attack

3. i.e. CV concept of SU (air + underground:
mobility)

(found the real weakness
channel of US.)

4. Current in: CF, D-L, FS, superiority

5. Support for (CDD) views:

i) mobile usable, unsubstantiated attack.

superiority is achievable, of either side

ii) SU was moving for it, we would not do that

iii) would give SU world domination it

"appeal, believable,

D-L - to unsubstantiated

at least,

preparation as been

and, known distraction than (high likelihood of) many FS

6. No argument (in US MT) was acceptable
(in ICBM)

1977-81

CW-II: a failure for democracy (Liberals, Reagan years?)

autonomous
EPR, in
contrast (?)
to CPO-I:

public manipulated (f. CPO, ~~rather~~ ~~manipulated~~)

Wt + Congress contribute to (arrogant)

public bias

("Team B")

. CIA circled

265

anti-SALT-II

(anti-Warlike move. (+ Sorenson?))

anti-Persona

anti-abortion

- gang

- ERA

- gun control

- Soviet threat

Spending → popular (misinformation)

vs. Brown's "referenda"

"Poker on right-wing frontiers"
Hills to Carter 9-16-79

24 [Alternative name chosen:

CANDOR on (reference?)

i) Russ/TX/D-2/CF, "defining"
Kare Winters

(US: FU, ES: Carol Ann, offhand?)

(Empire? Va.? Ha (VA...))

Interference?

?

- Relations with other states could reflect
human rights/dictatorship but not
be determined by them

(C's human rights record against
SU? ... SALT-II?)

- Va. "SU Threat" (but: US Response)

- Plan-Break

(Counter-proliferation)

- "Enemies" / Hittler

(not SU...)

REL 75-76 Chuck Hanks (Ford?)

Chuck Hanks to Russ in 1976: *

John Cloud "discovered" 2600 SU trucks in Cuba

in Sept. 79 (Barry Minton? 80?) (US: SALT-II
supports "Cuban Drive" after Black March 79

Hyd. 267 In center-left (Center) is less willing
to ally with Right ("progressives") than
center-right (neo-cons, CPD) is to ally with Right

center-left tends (unavoidable) overreaction
with center-right/Right coalition
Center, BHO
(Clinton?)

at ECA 121
(Halliburton: "Krugman and I thought down toward the
center (Lanning, 9/11?) on turning a deaf/turn
~~away~~ eyes to events on the Left."

267 Center "greater fear of a leftward direction to policy
than of the emergence of a shift to the
right."

[Lamar is friendly to Unilateral Communion - vs. CPD
(But, Big? Bigly?)

No? 267

under mining of GW?

(in BHO?)

Hillman

[I'm thinking: I should support Lamar:]

("like unilateral, unilateral with formal -
was further from left than from right individuals
on Right?")

so Center unexcited
for 50 years? (BHO?)
(SWOT)

R - mix - means - left
50 years unexcited for unilateral? (No, unilateral?)

4 1961-68-66⁻⁶⁷ I didn't reject "Humanitarian
interventions" i.e. (cover for) ^{US} empire!
Haven't

(Can't against "Com" in China? "US #1")
Is China "com"?

278 CPD: Iran (71) and Nicaragua (79) are US "interests"
SU "game" "Who lost...?"

279 Can't Empire's offensive actions are "economically defensive"

COVER

(Protect (back of)

279.

knowing, further -
on war...

279: Blockade/attacks:

confront Oth with

Liberty, Western

"on array of unacceptable

ambiguities

(military risks) gambles,

not intentions

(NOR EVEN "RISKS/PROB": AMBIGUITIES

279. CPD shipping list is (1979 (adapted by Carter))

MD [figure], B-1, Triant IV, (ALCMs? ~~and~~)

12-260B for 5 years
on budget

MM improvement P-II N production
(+ draft!)

1-12-16 Don't go now (BHO: not Russia!)

(It doesn't require a modern/weapon to
make "threats of moral action"
omissible

not all are attacks
could be omissible

(most of them, we NEEDS
marginally provided)

Eth bluff or "risk of loss of
control" (= moral strategy!)

can be effective!

(Both, dangerous!)

VN split Dem/Republicans

(and left was even comprehending
anti-imperial.)

281 False view of SO mis (+ capabilities)

through most of 20 years (except N?!))

late Reagan
early Carter: body gang
USA

Bastards

CDM/CD

Nitze

Gensolt

Murphy

JS says nothing of: ELK challenge Anderson?
Hostage Crisis
1980 Farin Road Officer SU Woy
(from Crisis)
2d Road Pl
OCT. SURPRISE

285 PD-59 Confession: CD proposed

"make over-fights" — CF disap.

(Simply problem just went but along line plans)

+ propos — give us forecast of MAO

(like SWB's "FS/EU")

— Paper on SU strategy!

(Words right? Probably: some intents
as wrt USAF?)

Being not 1/10 cities

2/10 disap?

Criticism of PD-59 was valid against me!

(or for SU?)

(Also — if plan suggests "good US FS" it
increases SU temptation if the could (not in 62)

Agenda: We don't need a military buildup
any more than we did in 1979-80's.

1.6T

(Was that needed for Hardwood, end of SU?

or did it delay G?

1983 degree of disruption!

R = JFK in Berlin + Cuba!

Henry: "There are more important things than peace ...
things our American should be willing to
fight for." 1-10-87

[FIGHT RUSSIANS?]

MORE IMPORTANT THAN PEACE

WITH SU? (VS. WAR WITH SU?)

NO!

for question now? SU
"R drive for (united) Europe!"

(Butin: German

"let terror" vs. "human rights"
(SU!)

maintain
SU policy

SU source of all "terror"!

292 Wentworth: R will probe provision & stop at line (?)

TR

2-10-16

X || CLOC and Alfred-Berl
both ignore the long source there -
very ^{Worst} thing "want" be known

+ note to effect
never - for US

(even, US beginning in
West Europe)

CANDOR: Here is what policy is ^{*} (think of DDI)
Here are efforts if it fails to enter

(an apparent, possible)

* on a line-trip to perpetrate attacks!
D-2, C.F. ...